Drone Swarms Need a New War Chest

The Pentagon is aggressively fielding autonomous military platforms, but its ability to keep them operational in the field is lagging far behind. While unmanned systems were once envisioned to reduce manpower, historical examples like the MQ-9 Reaper show they often demand more support personnel than their manned counterparts. Now, with initiatives like the Defense Autonomous Warfare Group (DAWG) aiming to deploy thousands of attritable autonomous systems, the sustainment challenge is becoming critical.

The core issue is that military infrastructure and logistics were designed for crewed platforms. The assumption that manpower scales linearly with hardware breaks down with unmanned systems, shifting the bottleneck from the platform itself to its support. Without a fundamental reinvention of how these systems are maintained and resupplied, the promise of autonomy will falter.

The Sustainment Bottleneck

Imagine a near-future operation in the vast Pacific: unmanned vessels and drones patrol for weeks, gathering intelligence and striking targets. But as sustainment issues arise, these systems are forced to fall back hundreds of miles for refueling or risk mission failure due to a lack of recovery nodes.

American defense firms can operate at machine speed, but the Pentagon struggles to match that tempo in the field. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has already flagged that Navy autonomy plans overlook required infrastructure, with acquisition costs for uncrewed vehicles omitting crucial lifecycle expenses.

GAO also documented declining mission-capable rates due to spare parts shortages, a lack of skilled maintainers, and aging infrastructure. Adding thousands of new unmanned systems without adequate support risks exacerbating these known problems, especially as sustainment can account for 70% of a platform's lifecycle cost.

Attritable systems, designed for rapid loss and replacement, are only effective if resupply is seamless. Without frictionless flow of parts and munitions into theater, commanders will hoard these assets, negating their intended purpose.

Market signals are already concerning, with vendors declining to bid on long-term sustainment work due to unclear or underfunded support programs. This can lead to an arsenal of expensive prototypes rather than deployable assets.

In the Indo-Pacific, the sheer scale makes traditional logistics impossible. The Army's own work on precision logistics highlights the need for autonomous resupply, a necessity even more pronounced at sea.

The Path to Autonomous Sustainment

Building blocks for autonomous sustainment do exist. DARPA's NOMARS program has demonstrated automated at-sea refueling, and systems like Sea Hunter have completed long-distance autonomous voyages.

A robust autonomous sustainment architecture for the Pacific would require machine-centric infrastructure: hardened, tiered autonomous ports and airbases enabling personnel-free recovery and survival during high-tempo conflict.

Containerized "base in a box" modules—standardized kits for power, weapons, storage, and command and control—could be deployed and chained together to scale capacity.

Robotic handling and turnaround infrastructure, from small-craft racks to ship-scale piers, would automate launch, recovery, and reloading.

An integrated energy and data spine, with forward-deployable power and hardened communications, would ensure each node can sustain operations and host autonomy at the edge, even when disconnected.

This entire ecosystem depends on a digital nervous system: fleet-wide telemetry and predictive maintenance, coupled with software that optimizes sustainment as a live problem. Companies like Rune Technologies are pioneering this in contested logistics.

Congress Must Lead

While Congress and the Department of Defense are not starting from scratch, oversight alone is insufficient. The U.S. is witnessing new technology outpace infrastructure in real time, exemplified by the lengthy delays in upgrading West Coast ports for new aircraft carriers.

Past Navy automation efforts aimed at reducing crew sizes backfired, increasing maintenance costs when systems failed and ultimately requiring more personnel. This historical trend makes assessing the true affordability of uncrewed maritime systems challenging.

Ignoring autonomous sustainment risks locking the U.S. into a model destined for failure in future conflicts. The entire investment in autonomy collapses if its support structure is inadequate.

Currently, most excitement and funding are platform-centric, with infrastructure treated as an afterthought. This creates several problems from a congressional perspective: no single entity owns the full architecture, infrastructure funding is vulnerable to cuts, and industry receives mixed signals, leading to a focus on prototypes over deployable systems.

A concrete plan for autonomous sustainment is urgently needed, with accountable leadership and clear deliverables. This includes prototyping integrated autonomous sustainment nodes in the Indo-Pacific, treating them as joint assets, and measuring success by throughput and resilience.

Infrastructure must be funded as part of autonomy programs, with dedicated authorizations and appropriations. Services should not be forced to squeeze these vital needs into existing, insufficient accounts.

A "test as you fight" approach, involving rapid, realistic exercises followed by quick fielding, is essential. The attritability of autonomy must be accepted, recognizing that new sustainment gaps will emerge as systems scale.

To compete with China's long-horizon industrial mobilization, Congress must provide durable industrial signals. This is an opportunity to solidify technology integration and culture change.

Future congressional hearings must ask not just "How many unmanned systems will you field?" but also, "Where will they plug in, and how many people will it take to keep them running?"

The U.S. bet on autonomy hinges on supporting infrastructure. Without it, autonomous swarms risk becoming immobile, rendered useless not by enemy fire, but by a lack of power and maintenance. A flexible sustainment spine is essential to transform these platforms into a true fighting force.